The 
Introduction
Mobile wireless users are in a constant quest for higher speed and ubiquitous coverage. However, data rate and coverage are complementary to each other [7] . As a mobile node (MN) moves in an environment that supports universal wireless access through heterogeneous wireless networks of different technologies operated by multiple service providers, it must be able to seamlessly roam from one network to another in a secure manner. In particular, the solutions that support such seamless roaming should ensure the authenticity of the entities as it connects to new domains.
For a MN to seamlessly roam across wireless networks, any active connection must not be broken and the handoff time should be minimum. Service continuity in handoffs is achieved by mobility management protocols like Mobile IP [14] and Mobile IPv6 [10] , in which the MN is able to use its home address in a foreign network. Another crucial issue for seamless roaming is the handoff delay that occurs as the MN moves from one network to another. For a smoother transition, a minimum handoff delay is desired.
A key reason for a longer handoff delay in the existing solutions for roaming across administrative domains is the delay introduced by the authentication process. Currently employed authentication protocols require the active participation of the home domain. For example, while roaming into a foreign GSM network, a challenge response mechanism is carried out between the mobile device and the authentication center at its home network [5] . Eliminating round-trip latencies to the home network can improve the speed with which the handoff takes place in a secure manner. This research work has been motivated by such a need for improved authentication approach that does not compromise the security of the handoff process while eliminating latencies due to the participation of the home network.
Inter-Domain Trust
Trust is an integral component required for cooperation between wireless networks. Conventionally, for mobile users to be able to roam into foreign networks, the foreign network and the mobile user's home network must trust each other and have a roaming agreement established beforehand. However, to achieve the vision of a ubiquitous wireless network with global coverage involving a mixture of large and small network operators and heterogeneous access technologies will require procedures for dynamically establishing trust and roaming relationships. In particular, we want interoperation between wireless domains which do not have direct roaming agreements.
Two wireless domains are said to be directlyconnected if they have direct trust and roaming agreements and they are said to be well-connected if there is at least one trust-path between them. Thus, the trust path can be used to establish roaming between domains without direct trust and roaming agreement.
Inter-Domain Authentication
Consider a MN trying to connect to a foreign wireless network which has a roaming agreement with its home network. The authenticator in the foreign network requests the identity of the MN, and the MN presents its Network Access Identifier (NAI) [1] , which has a form of user@domain. The Foreign Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAAF) server looks at the domain part of the NAI and sees that the MN does not belong to its administrative domain. It then checks if it has roaming agreements with MN's home domain, and if it does, it sends a message to the AAA at the MN's home domain (AAAH).
For a shared secret based authentication, AAAH performs a challenge-response authentication and sends an 'accept' or a 'reject' message as an outcome of the authentication. As shown in Figure 1 , this method consists of two round-trips to the home domain. Since the home domain could be situated across the globe, it is desirable to minimize the number of round trips to it. An enhanced challenge response based interdomain authentication method similar to the work of Laurent-Maknavicius and Dupont [12] , is shown in Figure 2 , where the challenge is generated locally at the authenticator, and the {NAI || Challenge || Response} triplet is carried to the AAAH which checks the response for that particular challenge and sends an 'accept' or a 'reject' message back. The enhanced challenge response mechanism only requires a single round trip to the home domain. The two methods shown above are simplified just to illustrate the number of round trips that may be required for an authentication to be performed by the home domain. In reality, depending on the technology used, the number of round trips required might be more. Various EAP methods could be used for authentication. For example, EAP-SIM for GSM, EAP-AKA for UMTS, PEAP, LEAP, EAP-TLS, or other flavors of EAP might be used for WLANs. More round trips to the AAAH will be required for setting up the session keys causing a large delay for the MN to get access to the network.
Related Work

Certificate Based Authentication
Certificate based authentication can be used to verify the claimed identities of two previously unknown entities. The two parties do not need to exchange secrets in advance and no prior trust relationships is required, making it more suitable for roaming scenarios in heterogeneous wireless networks. However, the use of certificates for authentication requires a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with a common root Certificate Authority (CA). Previous proposals using certificate based authentication in wireless networks [4, 15] assume that both MN and AAAF carry with it the selfsigned certificate of the root CA, which is used as a trust anchor to establish new trust between the MN and AAAF.
Certificates can also be used to establish trust relationship between two wireless domains by crosscertification. In such a case, each domain has its own root CA which issues certificates to all the mobile clients and other trustworthy domains with which it has roaming relationships. Thus, if a domain has roaming agreements with 'm' other domains, the AAA server of the domain carries 'm' corresponding certificates. The certificate issued by a partnering domain is known as a Roaming-Certificate.
In a similar work by Long, Wu, & Irwin [13] , public-key certificates are used for localized authentication without connecting to the home network of the MN as the certificate proves the identity of the MN. As shown in Figure 3 , the AAAF stores certificates issued by the CA of every domain it has roaming relationships with. A MN belonging to the home domain carries with it a certificate issued by its home domain's CA. It uses this certificate, H<<MN>> to authenticate at foreign domains that have trust relation with its home domain.
For mutual authentication, AAAF also sends the roaming-certificate H<<F>> to MN to prove its identity, which the MN verifies using the public key of its home domain. There are a few difficulties associated with public key certificates regarding certificate validation. Both MN and AAAF must validate each other's certificates during mutual authentication. This involves verifying the CA's signature on the certificates and checking their revocation status. If the MN's and foreign domain's certificates are signed by the CA of MN's home domain, the signature can be verified using the home domain's public key. However, the retrieval of the revocation status requires communicating with the home domain's CA. Also, MN does not have network access during the authentication phase to retrieve a revocation list. Therefore, the AAAF and the MN can carry out the authentication protocol without checking the revocation list. Once MN is authenticated and gets network access, both MN and AAAF can retrieve the revocation list from the home CA to verify the authenticity of the certificates.
In a different approach, as suggested in [4] , the MN could delegate the validation of the foreign domain's certificate to a trusted third party. The MN only needs to be sure of the revocation status of the trusted third party.
However, if there is no direct trust relationship between the home domain and the foreign domain, both MN and the foreign domain require a chain of certificates with a common root CA as the trust anchor between them. The construction of this certificate path requires certificate retrieval from several CAs until a trust anchor is reached, which causes long delays in the authentication process.
Media-Independent Pre-Authentication (MPA)
MPA [6] is a pre-configuration and preauthentication scheme that is executed by a MN to a target network before the actual handoff takes place. It can be used to enhance the performance of existing mobility protocols by proactively performing layer 3 and layer 4 associations and bindings before the actual handoff takes place, thereby saving time for these operations that usually only take place after the layer 2 association.
MPA is successful only when the MN can detect deteriorating signal strength and then have enough time to discover and select candidate networks to connect to, and initiate pre-authentication and pre-configuration procedures with the candidate network. However in a highly mobile scenario, pre-authentication steps might be broken abruptly which is undesirable.
Shadow Registration
In the Shadow Registration method [11] , a security association is established between a MN and every neighboring wireless network's AAA servers before the MN handoffs to one of the regions. This procedure operates like the shadow as one walks, thus the nameshadow registration. The registration will already be completed when the MN moves to a particular cell, and the only necessary AAA operations that are required will be processed locally in the new domain without communicating with the MN's home domain.
With a similar concept, Han et al. [8] have proposed Region-based Shadow Registration (RSR) which tries to increase the efficiency of Shadow Registration by performing a Shadow Registration only when the MN moves to a section with high probability of handoff.
Optimistic Access
Aura and Roe [3] have proposed the Optimistic Access scheme of network access control to minimize authentication delay. Instead of executing a stronger higher-delay authentication mechanism during the handoff process, the MN is granted optimistic access to the new network. The strong authentication is delayed until the handoff is actually completed.
When the MN handoffs to a new network, a faster but weaker authentication takes place, and after it is successful the MN is authorized for an optimistic access to the new network. When the layer 2 handoff process is complete, the MN must be involved in a new stronger authentication to continue using the resources of the new network.
The weaker authentication mechanism does not require any communication with the home network of the MN, thus making the optimistic access a fast authentication mechanism. However, security can be easily compromised with optimistic access, and it might be suitable only for private networks where users are more trustworthy. For less secure applications, optimistic access is not recommended as it creates a window of opportunity for malicious users to try to exploit vulnerabilities. Thus, authentication using optimistic access is a tradeoff between security and performance.
Proof Token Based Authentication
A proof token binds a subject's identity with a public key as a digital certificate does. Additionally, a proof token also proves the fact that the subject was successfully authenticated at the issuer's domain at the time it was issued.
The proof token method of authentication is an alternative to other authentication methods which involves the participation of the home domain. In this method, whenever a MN successfully authenticates in a wireless domain using any of the authentication methods, it requests and obtains a proof token from the AAA server in that domain, which proves the fact that the MN was successfully authenticated in that domain at that time. Similarly, the MN carries with it proof tokens issued by all the visited domains in a structure called the 'token store', which also contains the corresponding certificates of the issuing domains, and a list of distinguished names of roaming partners of the issuing domains.
Once the MN moves to another wireless network in a different domain, it has to re-authenticate with the new domain's AAA server. To decrease the reauthentication delay, the MN may present a proof token proving the fact that it was successfully authenticated in the previously connected wireless domain. Thus, in cases where the newly connected domain has trust relations with one of the MN's previously connected domain but not with its home domain, the MN may utilize proof tokens to authenticate itself. If the newly connected domain has direct trust relations with its home domain, it can use the certificate issued to it by its home domain's CA.
In the proposed method, accounting messages are sent to the home domain only after the authentication process is complete. The MN thus gets a quicker network access with local authentication, which provides better seamlessness than existing methods.
The fields of a proof token resemble the fields of an X.509 certificate but the interpretations are modified as shown in Table 1 . The proof token is signed by the issuer using its private key for integrity protection. The proposed EAP method for the Token Based authentication, called the EAP-Token method is essentially based on the industry standard EAP-TLS method [2] . It differs from EAP-TLS in that instead of the MN presenting a fixed X.509 certificate issued by a root CA, it presents a proof token issued by a foreign domain it has recently visited and with which the current domain also has roaming relations with. Another differing point is that the AAA server carries with it a number of roaming-certificates instead of a single certificate issued by a root CA. The roaming-certificates are issued by other wireless domains with which it has roaming relations with. The roaming-certificate binds the AAA server's identity with its public key. The AAA server of each domain carries with it 'm' number of cross-certified certificates from its 'm' roaming partner domains. The MN will use this public key to authenticate the AAA server and to encrypt the premaster secret.
For authentication of the MN, we require a common certificate authority as a trust anchor between the MN and the visited domain. A mechanism is thus required to find a common domain between all domains the MN has visited and obtained a proof token from, and all the domains the currently visited domain has roaming relationships with.
To find out which proof token to use, the MN sends a list of all visited domain's Distinguished Names in a message called DomainList after sending the initial ClientHello message. The AAA server chooses a common domain between MN's visited domain list and its roaming partner domain list, and sends the corresponding roaming-certificate. The rest of the message exchange is same as EAP-TLS.
Figure 4. EAP-Token Method
The exchange of EAP-Token messages between the MN and the AAA server in a foreign domain is illustrated in Figure 4 . The authenticator is not shown in the figure as it is operates in the EAP pass-through mode.
Similar to EAP-TLS, the MN initially sends a ClientHello message identifying the protocol version, cryptographic algorithms to use and a random number to use as a nonce. The MN next sends a list of domain names which it has visited recently, and for which it possesses a proof token in a DomainList message.
The DomainList message includes the X.500 Distinguished Name (DN) of its home domain and a sorted list of DNs of visited domains. The list is sorted so that the AAA Server may use the roaming relationship of the domain which is closest to MN's home domain in the trust path as shown in Figure 5 .
Figure 5. MN moves through visited domains
The AAA server first responds with a ServerHello message as in standard TLS. Then, it checks the list of DNs serially as it appears in the DomainList message beginning with the home domain of the MN, and selects the closest trust path to authenticate the MN. Once a common domain is found, it sends the corresponding roaming-certificate matching the common domain.
In the following ClientTokenRequest message, the AAA server requests the MN for the token issued by the common domain between them. The AAA server then sends a ServerHelloDone message to tell the MN that it has finished and is awaiting a response.
After receiving the ServerHelloDone message, the MN validates the roaming-certificate presented by the AAA server. The MN first extracts the issuer name of the roaming-certificate and retrieves the corresponding domain's public certificate from its token store. The MN can now validate the roaming-certificate using the public key of the common domain.
After validating the roaming certificate, it responds to the AAA server by sending the proof token issued by the common domain in a ClientToken message.
The MN then sends the ClientKeyExchange message which contains a randomly generated Pre-Master Key (PMK) encrypted with the public key of the AAA server. Using the PMK, the ServerRandom and the ClientRandom number from the hello messages, both parties compute the Master Key locally using the same pseudo random function as negotiated in the Server-Hello and ClientHello messages. If the AAA server is able to decrypt the PMK and complete the protocol, the MN is assured about the authenticity of the AAA server.
The remaining messages exchanged are similar to EAP-TLS. The MN uses its private key to sign a hash of all the messages exchanged up to this point and sends it in a CertificateVerify message. The AAA server can verify the signature using the public key of the MN as specified in the token. This proves the authenticity of the MN.
After sending the CertificateVerify message, the MN sends the ChangeCipherSpec message which notifies the AAA server that all the messages that follow the ClientFinished message will be encrypted using the keys and algorithms just negotiated. Following this message, the ClientFinished message is sent to verify the success of the key exchange and the authentication processes.
The AAA server then sends the final response to the MN with the ChangeCipherSpec and the ServerFinished message. The ChangeCipherSpec message notifies the MN that the AAA server will begin encrypting messages with the keys just negotiated and the ServerFinished message again verifies the success of key exchange and the authentication processes.
Thus, after completing the EAP-Token method, both the MN and the AAA server authenticate each other's identity and obtain master keys to derive further transient keys for data encryption and integrity protection. Since the EAP-Token method is based on EAP-TLS with the only difference being the use of tokens and roaming-certificates instead of PKI certificates, our proposed protocol has all the security features of EAP-TLS.
The use of EAP-Token can be beneficial for mobile nodes in future heterogeneous wireless networks to achieve fast re-authentication when roaming from one domain to another. With increasing number of wireless networks globally, it is infeasible to have one-to-one trust between them. However, if wireless networks are well-connected, an international traveler who roams across political and network boundaries can first connect to a major operator in a foreign country which has roaming agreements with his home network and then get a proof token to establish a trust path to connect to other wireless networks which have roaming agreements with that major network operator. Once the traveler hops around a few wireless networks, he should be able to connect to most of the wireless networks in that country.
Comparison
In the proposed token based approach for interdomain authentication, the EAP-TLS method has been extended to use tokens instead of certificates and a token selection and a roaming-certificate selection mechanism has been added as described in the previous section. Exploiting trust relationships between various domains in a heterogeneous wireless network with the help of tokens and roaming-certificates, mutual authentication is performed between the MN and the AAAF server without contacting the home domain.
The proof token based mechanism can be compared with the simple certificate based authentication as proposed by Long, et. al. [13] , MPA [6] , Shadow Registration [11] , and Optimistic Access [3] . In Table 2 , the comparison is shown in terms of the use of public key vs. secret key, mutual authentication support, privacy support, non-repudiation support, and the inter-domain trust required. Shadow Registration and MPA does not specify whether to use public key or secret key cryptography to use, and any one of them can be used. For MPA to work, the current domain is not required to have a trust relationship with the future domain. Only the MN needs to have trust relation with the domain it is trying to connect to.
For the proof token method, the various domains are required to have a well connected trust relationships. The various domains are not required to have a one-to-one trust, but, the degree of separation from one domain to the other should be minimal. The essence of well-connected domains is that if a MN has proof tokens of a few domains that it has visited recently, it can use the proof tokens to authenticate in most of the other domains it wants to visit.
In Table 3 , a comparison is made with respect to the handoff type: intra or inter-domain, proactive or reactive, fast, smooth, or seamless and the number of required roundtrips to the home domain. Shadow Registration and MPA are both proactive authentication methods in which the authentication is performed before layer 2 handoff. Whereas, in a reactive handoff, authentication is performed after the MN moves and connects to the new network. Similarly, a fast handoff primarily aims to minimize the handoff latency, whereas a smooth handoff tries to minimize the packet loss during handoff. On the other hand, in a seamless handoff there is no noticeable change in the quality of service for the user finds during the handoff.
From these two tables, we see that the proof token based authentication mechanism performs better than other protocols as it supports mutual authentication, privacy, and non-repudiation, and it does not require roundtrips to the home-domain during authentication.
Conclusions
In this work, we first defined the problem of seamless mobility in heterogeneous wireless environments to achieve ubiquitous connectivity. Authentication delay was identified as a major cause for high latency. With conventional authentication mechanism involving symmetric key cryptography, the home domain must participate in a number of round trip message exchanges. For the case of global mobility, the home domain might be across the globe behind high latency communication links. To eliminate the service disruption, the use of public key cryptography without the use of expensive PKI components was proposed.
In the proposed architecture, certificate-like proof tokens are used to complete an EAP-Token authentication method. The EAP-Token method is defined my modifying some of the protocol details of EAP-TLS. The changes and their purpose were highlighted and the EAP-Token protocol was also compared analytically with other related methods of authentication.
